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ABSTRACT
Uncertainty presents unique difficulties in optimization problems.

Deci-

sion Makers (DMs) are faced with risky situations requiring analysis of multiple outcomes in each solution.

Very few direct choice (interactive) methods

are capable of addressing problems with probabilistic outcomes.
general algorithm which will allow for uncertainty.

We present a

The method is appropriate

for use in a multiple criteria framework with a discrete number of possible
outcomes, but is explored and developed in the context of a bicriterion problem using a two stage mathematical programming model.

1.

Introduction
Determination of an optimal solution to a problem, or selection of a pre-

ferred alternative, is a product of model development, model (parameter) measurement, and model optimization.

Alteration of any of the three tasks can

lead to a change in the resulting decision.

If a problem has multiple cri-

teria and the alternatives have uncertain outcomes, the difficulties in model
development, measurement and optimization are compounded.

Interactive methods

may not be proper under uncertainty because the concept of an efficient frontier is lost when referring to expected utility.
Many papers exist on development of utility models under risk and multiple criteria.

Techniques for utility construction appear in Keeney and Raiffa

[1976] and approaches to ease the task of measuring utility functions are discussed in [Klein, et al 1982] and reviewed in [Farquhar 1984].

These utility

methods appear as the only major methodology under the case of uncertainty in
multicriteria optimization [Zionts 1979 and Hwang and Masud 1979].

The lack

of an interactive procedure for the case of uncertainty in multicriteria models excludes the advantages inherent in progressive preference articulation
methods.

The ease of use, speed and solution confidence [Wallenius 1975 and

Klein, Moskowitz and Ravindran 1985] would be a welcome asset to situations
where uncertainty is involved.

In order to capitalize on the benefits of an

interactive approach, many researchers have developed effective methodologies
to locate efficient solutions under certainty.

Among the better known methods

for nonlinear problems are those of Zionts and Wallenius [1976 and 1983],
Geoffrion, Dyer and Feinberg [1979], and Sadagopan and Ravindran [1982].
This paper develops an interactive method for handling a bicriteria problem under uncertainty with two uncertain outcomes.

The method combines the

two previous approaches by Geoffrion, Dyer, and Feinberg (GDF) [1976] and the
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Paired Comparison Method (PCM) of Sadagopan and Ravindran [ 1982].

A general

problem framework is described, followed by an algorithm and example.
2.

Problem Specification
Consider the mathematical program with two criteria and two uncertain

right hand side (RHS) vectors in the constraint set.

Denote the problem as

TSEU:
MAX

fu (X,Z)
fl2 (Y, Z)
f21 (X,Z)
f22 (Y,Z)

S.T. g1 (X,Z) < b1 ( 1)
gm (X, Z) < bm(l)
g1 (Y ,Z) < b1 (2)
•
gm (Y ,Z) < bm(2)
where

z

represents first-stage variables that require immediate commitment, X

and Y are second-stage variables that may be determined immediately prior to
implementation, f(.) is a concave, differentiable objective function, and g1,
to gm are convex, differentiable constraint functions.
As can be seen, the incorporation of uncertainty has increased the dimensionality of the problem.

The PCM could not solve this problem without the

necessary extensions to handle four criteria.

The GDF Method could solve this

problem by treating different outcomes of the same objective as separate objective functions, but the complexity of the problem has increased the dimensionality and the severity of the criteria tradeoff requests of the DM.

By

presenting the different outcomes as separate objectives to the DM when requesting tradeoff information, the true state of uncertainty is not properly
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represented.

This may lead to a bias on the part of the DM regarding trade-

offs across outcomes or across probabilities.
The problem is a two outcome generalization of others appearing in the
literature.

Let us begin with the simple two-stage model from Dantzig (1963]

or Wagner [1969] of one criterion and two right-hand-side vectors of known
probabilities (b(l) with probability PI, and b(2) with probability pz).

The

problem assumes that several decision variables require a commitment at the
present time.

These variables cannot be changed at a later date, however

there also exist variables that are flexible.

The flexible variables can be

changed after the true right-hand-side levels are known.

The variables re-

quiring an immediate commitment are called the first-stage variables.

The

flexible variables are called the second-stage variables.
A formulation for the two-stage decision would be
TS:

Max p 1f(X,Z) + pzf(Y,Z)

subject to:
gl (X,Z)
•

(

gm(X,Z)

(

.

.bl.• ( 1)
bm(l)

bl (2)
•
•
gm(Y,Z) < bm(2)

gl (Y ,Z)

(

.

where Z is the first stage variable vector, X is the second-stage vector associated with the first RHS (b(l)), Y is the second-stage vector associated with
the second RHS (b(2)), b(i) is the ith RHS vector of length m, f(•) is a concave, differentiable objective function, and gl to gm are convex, differentiabl~

functions.

Note that the formulation will determine a complete decision vector
(X,Y,Z).

Initially the decision variables in the Z vector would be
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implemented.

The second-stage variables X would be the plan for the first RHS
Another feature is the use of expected values in

and Y for the second RHS.
the objective function.

The Z vector is identical in each functional computa-

tion, but the second-stage variables differ, and each has a known probability
of being implemented.
values is available.

Thus all the information needed to compute expected
Because of the use of expected values, the incorporation

of more than two discrete options is a simple extension.
The two-stage (TS) model is appropriate in the context of utility theory
only if the decision maker's utility function is linear, and has known weights
on each outcome.

This means that no transformation of the criterion outcomes

are made prior to the taking of expectations.

If the utility function is .

known, but not of a simple form, then the model modifications would be to simply change the objective to compute utilities of the function prior to the expected value computations.

That is, Max PlU(f(X,Z)) + pzU(f(Y,Z)).

This pro-

cess would require a tedious utility function measurement as described in
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1976].

If, however, we assume no knowledge about the

utility function then the two uncertain outcomes must be separated.

The sep-

aration of the outcomes suggests the use of one of the interactive methods
discussed earlier.
TSU:

The formulation for this model (TSU) would appear:

Max f1 = f(X,Z)
f 2 = f(Y ,Z)

subject to the same constraint set in TS.
As can be seen, the resulting formulation is similar to a bicriterion
problem.
comes.

There is only one criterion, but the level has two possible outTo solve the problem for maximum expected utility is to find X, Y, and

Z such that the certainty equivalent to the implied lottery is maximized.

It
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would be possible to use the PCM for this problem by setting each outcome as a
separate criterion and solving as a two-stage problem.

The GDF method could

also handle this problem in a similar fashion.

A moderate twist to the model in problem TSEU is when the uncertainties
in a bicriterion model are in the objective function instead of the right hand
side.

Allow only 2 uncertain outcomes but associate them with parameters

in the objective function.
TSO:

The formulation for the two-stage objective is:

l1ax fu(X,Z)
f12(X,Z)
f21(X,Z)
f22(X,Z)

subject to:

where b(l) are the certain RHS constants and fij is the function for the ith
criterion at the jth parameter level (outcome).
this problem in the same fashion as problem TSEU.

The GDF method could handle
The existing PCM could

handle the problem only by utilizing expected values.

It is also important to

note that for this case, the decision variables are now all first-stage _variables, and the true state of nature need not be determined in order to make
the decisions.
In a final variation, Bard [1983] discusses a Bi-level Programming Problem that is an extension of the two-stage model allowing for the objective
functions to be different functions rather than different possible occurrences
of the same function.

When two levels of management have conflicting objec-

tive functions the top management objective may be satisfied prior to the lower management objective.
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3.

An

Interactive Algorithm Under Uncertainty

The purpose of this section is to develop a method that will solve the
above problems without increasing the dimensionality of the vector maximization and reduce the number of criteria requiring tradeoff information.

Fea-

tures from both the PCM and GDF Method will be used to provide a method which
presents the DM with the easiest questions possible.
The approach will utilize tradeoff information as does the GDF, to provide a direction to travel in the feasible region.

The method will not re-

quire specific tradeoff values of the DM for all criteria across all outcomes,
but will estimate tradeoffs using paired comparisons within each outcome.
Thus, the questions asked of the DM will be structured after the soft interactions of the PCM.
3.1

Problem Structuring
Consider partitioning problem TSEU into two bicriterion mathematical

programs:
BMP 1:

BMP 2:

Max fu(X,Z)

Max f 12 (Y ,z)

fz 1 (X,Z)

fzz(Y,Z)

subject to

subject to

g(X,Z) < b(l)

g(Y,Z) < b(2)

BMP 1 represents the problem to be solved when the RHS is b(l).
the RHS is b(2).

BMP 2 is when

Each problem will have an associated payoff vector set (V1

and Vz) such that
v1

=

{Vjf 11 (X,Z), f21 (X, Z) = v for some x,z where g(X,Z)

Vz = {Vjf 1z(Y,Z), fzz(Y,z)

=v

for some Y,Z where g(Y,Z)

(

b( 1)}

(

b(2)}.
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BMP 1 and BMP 2 now provide an opportunity to examine each outcome independently.

However, feasibility may be lost if BMPl is solved and outcome 2

is the true state of nature.

Thus a link, in the form of minimum achievement

levels and duplicated constraints must be made between BMPl (Outcome 1) and
BMP2 (Outcome 2).

These levels are denoted a11 and a21 for the minimum

achievement levels of f11(X,Z) and fzl(X,Z).

They will permit the separate

optimization of the outcomes while maintaining feasibility.

The selection of

the specific levels are discussed during the development of the procedure.
The resulting problems are conditional bicriterion mathematical programs
(CBMP) and would appear as:
CBMP1(a12' az2):

CBMP2 (a 11 , a 21 )

Max fu(X,Z)

Max f 12 (Y,Z)

f 21 (X,Z)

f 22 (Y,z)

Subject to

Subject to

g(X,Z) < b(l)

g(X,Z) < b(l)

g(Y, Z) < b(2)

g(Y,Z) < b(2)

f12(Y,Z) > a12

fu(X,Z) > au

f 22 (Y,Z) > a22

f21 (X,Z) > azl

The aij are determined at each iteration of the algorithm proposed later in
this section.

Each of the above problems will have an associated payoff set

that is a reduction of the V1 and Vz sets due to the extra constraints in
CBMPl and CBMP2.

These reduced payoff sets will be determined by the tight-

ness of the minimum achievement levels.
Formally,

v1 = v1 (a 12 ,

a 22 ) = {Vjf 11 <x,z), f 21 <x,z)

=v

for some X,Z where g(X,Z) < b(l), g(Y,Z) < b(2),
fl2(Y,Z) ) a12, and f22(Y,Z) ) a22}
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vz • vz(all' a12)

= {VIflz(Y,Z),

fzz(Y,Z)

=V

for some Y,Z where g(Y,Z) < b(2)
g(X,Z) < b(l), f11(X,Z) ) a11' and fzl(X,Z) ) azl}•
Note that v 1 is contained in V and vz is contained in Vz.

Therefore, an

efficient solution to CBMPl may not be efficient to BMPl but a feasible solution to CBMPl will be feasible for BMPl (figure 1).

This point becomes

important, because it is through the manipulation of the minimum achievement
levels, and thus the manipulation of CBMPl(alz, azz), CBMP2(all,a21), vl, and

Vz

that the algorithm moves toward a final solution.

Since in the process of

maximizing expected utility the conditional bicriterion formulations will be
used, we introduce the concepts of efficiency and mutual efficiency.
Definition:
fk(X 0

,

yO,

ZO)

A solution X0

for some X, Y, Z

for at lease one other index j.

yO, Z0

,

E

Sis efficient if fk(X,Y,Z)

S implies that fj(Z,Y,Z)

E

< fj(X 0 ,

Y0 , Z0 )

Consider the set of efficient solutions to

CBMPl (alz, azz) and the set of efficient solutions to CBMP2(all,a21)•

y*, z*
only if

>

x*,

is mutually efficient to CBMPl (alz, azz) and CBMP2 (all' azl) if and

x*, y*, z*

belongs to both sets of efficient solutions.

Mutual effeciency (ME), like efficiency, is a property to ensure that a
solution under consideration is non-dominated, and thus a candidate for the
most satisfactory solution.

This implies three properties, the latter two of

which will be subsequently proven.

The first property is that, by definition

of ME and efficiency, a non-dominated solution is present for each problem
CBMPl and CBMP2.

This indicates that when a DM is presented a ME solution to

CBMPl and CBMP2 he is assured that no attribute improvements can be made within any outcome without detrimenting another attribute within the same outcome
or at least one attribute in the remaining outcome.
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A second property is that a ME solution to CBMPl and CBMP2 is an efficient solution to the general problem TSEU.

This implies that a simple method

which utilizes the partitioning of TSEU into CBMPl and CBMP2 will have an
efficient point in TSEU.

Thus finding a ME solution to CBMPl and CBMP2 yields

an efficient solution to TSEU.
Theorem 1:

x*, Y*, z* is efficient to TSEU iff a decision variable

vector x*, y*, z* is ME to CBMPl and CBMP2.
Requirements of Feasibility.

Denote the feasible region for TSEU as S

and the feasible regions for CBMPl and

~MP2

and S1 and S2•

Any (X,Y,Z)

or S2 is also an element of S since Sl and S2 are subsets of S.
(X,Y,Z) feasible to CBMPl and CBMP2 is feasible to TSEU.
sideration, any point (X,Y,Z)
f12(Y,Z), and f22(Y,Z).

Sufficieny.

S1

Thus any

To reverse the con-

Swill yield values for fll(X,Z), f21(X,Z),

£

Let these values be all• a21• al2• and a22 respec-

tively and (X,Y,Z) becomes
Proof:

£

£

S1 and S2 by definition.

Let (X*,y*,z*) be ME to CBMPl and CBMP2.

If

(X*,y*,z*) is not efficient to TSEU, then there exists a point (X 0 , Y0 , Z0 )
such that fij(X 0

,

Z0 )

> fij(X*,z*)

for a11(i,j) and at least one of the fol-

lowing:
fll(Xo,zo)

> f11 ( X* ,Z* )

all•

f2l(Xo,zo)

> f21(X * ,Z*)

a21•

fl2(Yo,zo)

> f 12 <Y*,z*> = al2•

f22(Yo,zo)

> f 22 <Y*,z*> = a22•

or

This however, means that (X*, y*, z*) is not efficient to either CBMPl
(a12,a22> or CBMP2 (all•a21)•
Necessity:

Thus ME is contradicted.

Let (x*,y*,z*) be efficient to TSEU.

For CBMPl to not be

efficient would imply an (X 0 ,Y0 ,Z0 ) such that f11(X 0 ,Z 0 )

> f11<x*,z*)

or
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This contradicts efficiency of TSEU, thus (X*,Y*,z*)

f 21 (x0 ,Z0 ) ) f2 1 <x*,z*).
is efficient to CBMPl.

A similar argument holds for CBMP2.

Since CBMPl a

CBMP2 are both efficient at (X*,Y*,z*) and feasible, (X*,y*,z*) is mutually
efficient to CBMPl and CBMP2.
A final property is that when the constraints on the objective functions
within the conditional bicriterion mathematical programs are tight and an efficient solution to CBMPl-is found for an efficient payoff in CBMP2 is known,
a ME solution is also found.

This permits verification of the ME property

within an algorithm.
Theorem 2.

x*,y*,z* is ME to CBMPl and CBMP2 if (a12' a22> is an

efficient payoff in CBMP2, x*,y*,z* is efficient to CBMPl (a12' a22),
f 12(Y*,z*)

= a12'

Proof:

and f22<Y*,z*)

K

a22•

Since (a12,a22> is an efficient payoff vector in CBMP2 there is

no feasible Y in CBMP2 such that {f12(Y,Z*)

> a12

and f22(Y,z*) ) a22} or

Thus by definition X* ,Y* ,Z* is efficient to CBMP2 and by construction to CBMPl and is therefore ME to CBMPl and
CBMP2.

The argument must be repeated for the reversal of CBMPl and CBMP2 in

order to be complete.
3.2

A Stepwise Technique
Using the efficiency concepts, the development of an algorithm that main-

tains mutual efficiency at each iteration is desired.

In order to accomplish

this task a method will be developed that utilizes the above properties.

The

method will start by finding a mutually efficient solution using existing MCDM
techniques.

Once a starting point is determined, the algorithm will use

tradeoffs to estimate utility functions for the decision maker.

With esti-

mates of the utility functions, the method will explore the feasible region of
one outcome while relaxing the criterion levels in the second.

11

Theorem 1 will be implied in the exploration to retain feasibility and to
insure an efficient solution is secured to TSEU when an ME solution to CBMPl
and CBMP2 is secured.

The exploration is conducted to insure that the condi-

tions implying ME in Theorem 2 are preserved.

Thus, a new efficient solution

to TSEU is found that is used as a starting point for the next iteration.

The

steps are as follows:
Step 0:

Initialize the Iterations:

Solve CBMPl (minimum achievements) using the PCM.
outcome 1 (Ql), with solution (X,Y,Z).
Solve CBMP2 (a11,a21) using the PCM.
solution (X0

,t',z0).

Set all

This is denoted as

= f11(X,Z)

and a21(X,Z).

Denote this as outcome 2 (Q2), with new

Set a12 = f12(Y 0 ,Z 0 ) and a22

= f22(Y 0 ,Z0 ). The starting

points would be as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1

In initializing the method, the PCM is recommended to determine starting
values.
1.

This is to insure accurate estimations of the linear utility in Step

In addition, by starting at the preferred solution in each outcome, the

method may start closer to the preferred solution across all outcomes.

Mutual

efficiency will exist at this point in the algorithm because no better solution exists for Ql from a utility viewpoint, and Q2 from CBMP2(all,a21) is defined by the efficient vector (X*,y*,z*).
Step 1:

Generate Local Tradeoffs:

Approximate the slope for a linear utility function for each outcome.
Ask the DM how much increase does he expect in criterion 2 in Ql for a unit
decrease in criterion 1.

Let the response be X11•

question in Q2, let the response be X21•

Set X22

Set X12

= 1.

= 1.

Ask the same
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The tradeoff questions are similar to those asked when measuring value
functions (Kenney and Raiffa 1976).

If the wish is to eliminate questions of

the DM at this step, the tradeoffs may be approximated in a fashion requiring
no interaction.
P).:

Within each outcome solve the problem

MAX f1j
subject to:

g(X,Z) ( b(1)
g(Y, Z) ( b( 2)
flj(X,Y,Z) ) a1j
f2j(X,Y,Z) ) a2j - 1,

where the last constraint permits a unit drop in the level of the second criterion and the solution is (XA,yA,zA).

This will provide an adjacent effi-

cient point that can be used to determine the values by setting A1j
flj(XA,yA,zA) - f 1j(XO,y0,z0 ) .

s

Since the DM selected the solution (X 0 ,Y 0 ,Z 0 )

by using the PCM, the line estimated will be close to that provided by a direct tradeoff value given a consistent DM.

c

The tradeoffs derived are in terms

of the criteria, not the decision variables, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Step 2:

Determine Direction to Travel:

The directional problem may be derived from CBMP2.

Let the vector

(a11,a21) be the incumbent outcome Q1 generated in either Step 0 or Step 3.
Let r range from 0 to 2n radians with 0 as arbitrary due north.
distance
Ql =

=1

in the criteria levels may thus be represented:
au + cos( r)
azl + sin(r).

Any change of
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Since we are looking for the direction of maximal expected utility increase,
we are solving the general objective function: Max p[U(Ql) - U(Ql)] +
(l-p)[(Q2)- U(Q2)], where 01 is the outcome i from the direction search step
of the current iteration, U(Q2) is a constant, and U(Ql)- U(Ql) reduces to
U(cos(r),sin(r)) due to linearity assumptions, and U(Q2) is determined by the
CBMP2(all,a21) objective function.
DIR:

Thus the directional problem becomes:

Max p[Allcos(r) +

Subject to:
0 < r < 21T

g(X,Z) < b(l)
g(Y,Z) < b(2)
f11(X,Z) ) a11 + cos(r)
fzl(X,Z) ) a21 + sin(r)
where Aij represent linear utility weights on the criteria.
Using the A's determined in Step 1 as linear utility weights on the criteria, solve problem DIR.

Figure 3 shows the workings of problem DIR.

As

r

varies direction with constant radius of length= 1, in Ql, the estimated linear utility function in Q2 will shift outward (or inward) to its best value.
Since r is a variable, the maximum increase in expected estimated utility is
found by DIR for a unit change in the criteria.

The utility will increase for

any positive value of the objective to problem DIR, so global optimality to
problem DIR may not be necessary.

Figure 3
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Step 3:

Find the Distance of Travel

Solve CBMP2 (au+ a(cos(r)), a21 + a(sin(r))) at several values of a
from 0 to a maximum distance.

Denote the solutions as (Xd, yd, zd).

The

optimization could be accomplished by using the PCM for each distance on Q2
(this would be tedious) or by using the linear approximations (Aij's) from
Step 1 to solve:

subject to:

f11(X,Y,Z) ) a11 + acos(r)
f21(X,Y,Z) ) a21 + asin(r)
for each a selected.
For each solution present a lottery to the DM.

Each lottery would be

<fll(xd,yd,zd) , f 21 (xd,yd,zd)> as Ql with probability p, and <fl2(xd,yd,zd),
f 22 (xd,yd,zd)> as Q2 with probability (1-p).
tance then stop.

If a= 0 is the preferred dis-

Else set aij = fij (Xd,yd,zd) of the preferred lottery for

all i and j, and return to Step 1.

The distance determination would progress

as shown in Figure 4.
It may also be appropriate to verify mutual efficiency by making certain
the constraints in CBMP2 that generated the chosen lottery are tight.

If not,

correct by adding the slack values to the minimum achievement levels associated with Ql before presenting the outcomes to the DM.

It is also possible to

correct by solving CBMP2(fl2(Y,Z), f22(Y,Z)) with the PCM where Y and Z are
the solutions from the CBMP2 that generated the preferred lottery.

Figure 4
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3.3

More Than Two Criteria, Outcomes
As the number of criteria increases, the number of conditional problems

remain the same.

The changes would involve adding objectives and constraints

to each conditional problem.
problems increases.

As outcomes are added, the number of conditional

The major stumbling block for larger problems would be

the amount of information provided to the DM at each iteration.

In addition

to more than two criteria, the DM may be faced with viewing lotteries with
many outcomes.

Also, the simplistic direction and distance finding problems

would have to be replaced by methods that handle more complexity.

4.

Applications
Two Problems Illustrate the Use of the Method.

4.1

Uncertainty in the Right Hand Sides:

Example

A common occurence, is the uncertainty of the RHS in a specific mathematical program.

In a production mix framework, resource suppliers are not al-

ways dependable, machines break down, or cash flow may be strained.

This

leads to differing feasible regions and differing production plans.

This cor-

responds to problem TSEU.
No first-stage variables appear in this example problem, not being
tant in the demonstration of the algorithm.
production problem.

impor~

Consider a raw material intensive

Assume that resource requests are being filled, and that

the three raw materials will have a constraint vector of (in thousands of
units):
RM

with .5

= 25

with .5

= 15

probability,

= 20

probability.

= 40

or

= 45

1

=

2
3

30

I6

Only two prqducts are made from these raw materials, desks (xi) and chairs
(xz).

Two objectives exist at the corporate level, increased market share and

increased profit.

The BMPI associated with this problem is:

fi = profit (p) • xi + 3xz
Max
fz = market share (MS) = xi + xz
Subject to:
xi

(

RMI

xz

(

RM2

XI + 2x2 < RM3
xi, xz) 0 and in thousands of units.
In addition to these constraints, the company has placed a limit on the flexibility of the variables.

The flexibility limits may be expressed by the

addition of the following constraints using:

Ixi

- Ytl "" Bt

lxz - Y21

• Bz

lx1 + 2x2 - YI - 2yzl ... e3
ei + Bz + e3 <

s.

Bi represents the absolute deviation in resource usage for raw material
i.
ple.

Total deviations are restricted to be less than 5000 units in this examThese represent estimates of the purchasing department regarding the

ability to secure differing resources in a limited time frame.
At any iteration of this algorithm, a variation on CMBPI(alz, azz) is
used in the direction finding and distance steps.
method for this problem would appear:
BMPA

Max AI(I + 3xz) + Az(xi + xz)

The BMPA using Geoffrion's
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Subject to:
x1 " 25

xz (

20

x1 + 2x2 " 45
Yl ( 30
Y2 " 15
Yl + 2Y2 ( 40
lx1

- YII

- sl

lx2 - Y21 = s2
lx2 - 2x 2 - Yl - 2Y21 = s3
sl + S2 + S3 " 5
Yl + 3y 2 ) 12
Y1 + Y2 ) 22

With the specific production problem outlined above, let us apply our algorithm.

Assume the decision makers true utility is:

(MS/40)2 -(p/60)2.
ty occurs at MS

U

=

(MS/40) + (p/60) -

Using a quadratic mathematical program, the optimal utili-

= 35,

~

= 42.5,

=55 for v1, and MS

p

= 47.5

timal plan under the first RHS vector occurs at x1 = 25,
mal plan under the second RHS vector is Yl

= 25,

Y2

= 10.

for v2•

xz = 7.5.

The opThe opti-

The beta constraint

is tight.
Step 0:
MX

= 34.

Utilize the PCM on CBMP2(0,0).

Denote this as Q2.

Set a12

efficient solution to define Ql.
Step 1:

= 46

The solution out is p

= 46

and

and a22 • 34 and use BMPA to get an

This may occur at p • 57 and MS

At this step we request local tradeoff information.

= 27.
Using the

decision maker's true utility, we find an increase in MS of .54 will compensate for a unit decrease in for outcome 2 (Q2).

The tradeoff for 01 is 1.86.
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Step 2:

Construct problem DIR using the tradeoff information to

approximate the utility with a linear function.

(Scale As to sum to 1.)

DIR:
MAX

.5[.65cos(r) + .35sin(r)] + .5[.35f1(x) + .65f2(x)]

Subject to the same constraint set as in the previous example plus
X1 + 3x2) 46 + cos(r), and
X1 + X2 ) 34 + sin(r).
The best direction is found at 4.975 radians.
Step 3:

Using the direction indicated, the distance lotteries are gEmer-

ated for several distances.

The distance problem is:

MAX .35f1(x) + .65f2(x)
subject to the same constraint set as the direction problem in Step 2, but set
r • 4.975 and multiply the trigonometric functions by the distance.

The

lotteries generated are in Table 1.
TABLE 1

Distance Lotteries for the Production Example
Distance

Lottery p : .5, (1-p) : .5
('IT, MS)

1

<(33,47);

(34.5,53.5)>

2

<(32 ,48);

(35,55)>

3

<(31,49);

(35,55)>

5

<(30,50);

(35,55)>

The decision maker would prefer the lottery at the distance of 2.

How-

ever, the slack variable for the market share criterion in v1 has become positive.

Using the remedy of solving CBMP1(f12(Y,Z), f22(Y,Z)) by the PCM, where
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Y and Z are from the solution to the BMP of the preferred lottery, optimality
is achieved.
iteration.

Optimality would not be confirmed until Step 2 of the next
In this example, where all the conditions for the algorithm are

met, the exact optimal is reached.

Three PCMs were performed, two tradeoff

conditions were evaluated, and one series of lotteries was presented to the
decision maker.
4.2

Uncertainty in the Objective Function
In order to examine the methods ability to handle a variety of problem

structures, an integer acceptance sampling model for quality control was used
as a test problem.

Two criteria in quality control settings are Average Out-

going Quality (AOQ) and Average Lot Inspection Cost (ALIC).
set is composed only of items natural to the problem:

The constraint

1) sample size is be-

tween 0 and lot size, and 2) acceptance level is between 0 and sample size.
These features will not change under uncertainty.
ly change is the true lot fraction defective.

The feature that may readi-

A different value for lot frac-

tion defective will yield a different AOQ and ALIC.

Thus when prior percent

defective becomes a distribution rather than a point estimate, difficulties
arise.

The model is described in detail in [Moskowitz, Ravindran, Klein, and

Eswaren 1982].
One method of handling the uncertainty aspect would be to take expected
AOQ and ALIC values.

These expected values may be optimized by the PCM or

preference assessment methods [Moskowitz, et al, 1982].

A second, more appro-

priate approach is to consider the risk by utilizing a utility measure.

Maxi-

mum expected utility would be the objective and would correspond to problem
TS.

The RHS values are deterministic, but the parameters in the objective

function are uncertain, so that the function f11(X,Z) may not necessarily be
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equivalent to f 12(X,Z).

All variables in this problem are first-stage vari-

ables since the true state of nature is not determined except under complete
sampling.
Let us use the specific problem:
f1

= AOQ

• (N-n)PAPo/N

f2 = ALIC - nCr + (N-n)(1-PA)Cr
when n

= sample

size,

PA = Probability of Acceptance

=

f(hypogeometric distribution, n,
acceptance level, Pd)
N

= lot

size

c1 = Cost
Pd

= 100,

of inspection per unit • $12,

Percent defective

= 10%

with p

=

.25

15% with (1-p)

=

.75

Assume the decision maker's true utility function is U • 2 - .3(ALIC/1200)2
- AOQ2.

In order to permit comparison, the maximum expected utility as

determined by complete enumeration occurs at:
AOQ (10%)
ALIC (10%)
AOQ (15%)
ALIC (15%)
n
c

= .09437
= 67.57

=

.1392
86.40

=

2

-=

5

It should be noted that this Quality Control Model does not fit the convexity
condition required for global optimality, but the algorithm will hopefully
prove to be robust.

Optimization was performed using an integer modification

to Box's complex search [Box 1965).
The methodology terminated after two iterations with a final solution
of:
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AOQ (10%)
ALIC (10%)
AOQ (15%)
ALIC (15%)
n
c

=

=

.09498
60.29
.14227
61.8
5
3,

or, not far from the optimal.
5.

Conclusion
The methodology for an interactive procedure under uncertainty is devel-

oped.

The process relies heavily on the theory and methodology of the Paired

Comparison Method and the Geoffrion, Dyer and Feinberg method.

The general

development handles uncertainty in either the objective or the RHS.

In order

to implement the procedure, a concept of mutual efficiency is defined, and
theory determining the existence of mutual efficiency is developed.

A limit-

ing factor is the ability of a Decision Maker to handle lotteries involving
multiple outcomes and multiple criteria.

These limits suggest research into

ways to decompose the questions, into proper questioning methodologies, and
possible decision aids to help the DM better visualize the outcomes.
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